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LAW AND THE EXPERIENCE OF POLITICS IN LATE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NORTH CAROLINA:
NORTH CAROLINA CONSIDERS THE
CONSTITUTION
Walter F. Pratt,Jr.*
In mid-summer 1788, nearly three hundred delegates assembled in
Hillsborough to consider whether North Carolina would ratify the Constitution drafted the previous year in Philadelphia.1 When the convention
began the delegates were certain of two facts: First, regardless of their
decision, a government would soon be established; ten states had already
ratified the Constitution, one more than necessary. 2 Second, the opponents of the Constitution knew they had a substantial majority in the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I am indebted to the editors

of the Documentary History of the Constitutional Convention at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for so graciously allowing me access to their files. Part of the research for this
article was funded by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to the
Duke University Department of Continuing Education.
1. The state legislature authorized the election of 291 delegates and directed that they
meet "to take into consideration the aforesaid Constitution, and if approved of by them, to
confirm and ratify the same in behalf and on the part of this State." 20 THE STATE RECORDS
OF NORTH CAROLINA 196, 371 (W. Clark ed. 1902) [hereinafter SRNC]. For the journal of the
convention, see 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 1-252 (J. Elliot ed. 1901)
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. For an abbreviated journal, see 22 SRNC, supra, at 1-35.
For accounts of the North Carolina convention, see 2 S. AsHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA
85-95 (1925); F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
310-21 (1958); J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788

(1961); L. TRENHOLME, THE

RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN NORTH CAROLINA

(1932); Best, The Adoption of the Federal Constitution by North Carolina,5 TRINITY COLLEGE HIsT. Soc'Y PAPERS 12 (1905); Connor, The Convention of 1788-'89 and the Federal
Constitution - Hillsborough and Fayetteville, 4 N.C. BOOKLET 1 (Aug. 1904); Pool, An
Economic Interpretationof the Ratificationof the Federal Constitution in North Carolina,
27 N.C. HIST. REV. 119, 289, 437 (1950); Raper, Why North Carolina at First Refused to
Ratify the FederalConstitution, I ANN. REP. OF THE Am. HIST. A. FOR 1905, at 99-107 (1906).
2. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 251-52 (Willie Jones refers to ten states as having ratified); 1 THE JOHN GRAY BLOUNT PAPERS 404 (A. Keith ed. 1952), James Iredell to
John Gray Blount (June 19, 1788) (reports that Virginia has ratified constitution); 2 G.
McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 230-31 (1857-58) [hereinafter
McREE's IREDELL], Davie to Iredell (July 9, 1788) (reports that Virginia has ratified and
comments on amendments proposed by that state); Pennsylvania Hist. Soc., Hollingsworth
Papers, Spaight to Hollingsworth (July 3, 1788) (reports that Virginia has ratified; glad that
New Hampshire is well disposed toward the constitution). The delegates to the North Carolina convention also knew that the New York convention was underway; they did not, however, learn of New York's ratification (on July 26) until after their own convention adjourned. See 2 WARREN-ADAMS LETTERS 303 (1925) (vol. 73 of Massachusetts Hist. Soc.
Collections), James Winthrop to Mercy Warren (August 26, 1788).
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convention. 3 That majority refused to succumb to the success of the Constitution in other states; they did, however, make a significant concession
to the political realities by deciding to seek amendments to rather than
outright defeat of the Constitution. 4 Thus, after eleven days of what may
only loosely be termed deliberation, the North Carolina convention temporized. They would not ratify the Constitution, but neither would they
formally reject it. Instead, they resolved to wait until a bill of rights had
been presented to Congress and until a subsequent convention of states
was called to amend the Constitution.5 Eighteen months later, after Congress submitted a bill of rights to the states, North Carolina quietly ratified the Constitution. For a decision that today seems to have such extraordinary import (the decision to join in union with the other states) to
turn on such an apparently insignificant gesture (the submission, not the
ratification, of a bill of rights) suggests something of the paradoxical na3. New York Hist. Soc., Lamb Papers, Federal Constitution 1788-1789, Timothy
Bloodworth to John Lamb (June 23, 1788) (stating existence of decided majority against the
proposed government). In spite of that knowledge, however, some still thought that North
Carolina might follow the lead of Virginia and combine ratification with proposed amendments. See, e.g., 1 THE PENTIGREW PAPERS 528 (S. Lemmon ed. 1971), Charles Pettigrew to
Peter Singleton (July 14, 1788) (Pettigrew thought North Carolina would follow lead of
Virginia).
4. 2 MCREE'S IREDELL, supra note 2, at 230, Davie to Iredell (notes decision to give
weight to proposed amendments).
5. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 242. Clason gave the debates the name "The
Non-Ratifying Convention of North Carolina." A. CLASON, SEVEN CONVENTIONS 120 (1888).
North Carolina's action was what Antifederalist leaders had proposed in 1787. S. BoYD, THE
POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION 19-20
(1979). Thomas Jefferson had made a similar suggestion. See 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 5 (P. Ford ed. 1895), Jefferson to Madison (February 6, 1788). See Willie Jones'
speech in the North Carolina convention, ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 225-26. Al-

though the decision was unique among the states, this was not the first time that North
Carolina had temporized on an important matter. In 1776, when the provincial congress
attempted to draft a constitution for the state, the delegates were unable to agree; they
postponed the debate for six months. See 1 S. ASHE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 527-31,
556-69 (1908) (history of 1776 constitution); 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
1037-38 (W. Saunders ed. 1890) [hereinafter CRNC], letters to James Iredell from Samuel
Johnston and Thomas Jones (May 1776) (constitution issue not discussed fully); H. LEFLER
& W. POWELL,

COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA 281-83 (1973); H. WAGSTAFF, STATE RIGHTS AND
POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1776-1861 9-12 (Johns Hopkins University Studies

in Historical and Political Science, ser. 24, nos. 7-8, 1906) (history of 1776 constitution).
Some years later, when the Articles of Confederation came before the state legislature, the
legislators first sought to approve only part of the Articles; they later ratified the entire
document. M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 186 (1940) (account of writing and
ratification); Douglas, Thomas Burke, DisillusionedDemocrat, 26 N.C. HIST. REV. 150, 16869 (1949) (partial ratification originally); 12 SRNC, supra note 1, at 229, 411-12, 599, 608-09,
708-09, 711, 717-18 (partial, then complete, ratification); 13 SRNC, supra note 1, at 102, 452
(partial, then complete, ratification).
6. There is no journal of this convention other than the abbreviated report in 22
SRNC, supra note 1, at 36-53. This convention also proposed amendments, eight in number,
none of which were ever ratified. For an effort at explaining the abrupt about-face, see Newsome, North Carolina'sRatification of the Federal Constitution, 17 N.C. HIST. REv. 287,
296-99 (1940).
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ture of the constitutional debate in North Carolina.
Part of the paradox arises from the fact that the delegates' task of
considering the proposed Constitution forced them into one of two debating positions: they were either for the Constitution or against it. There
was no apparent position of compromise. Indeed, as Governor Samuel
Johnston told the Convention, "If we reject any one part, we reject the
whole."'7 Such a bipolar world necessarily exaggerated differences between
individuals during discussion of particular provisions. When the time
came to conclude the convention, however, the delegates crafted a solution which more accurately reflected the fact that the two camps agreed
on more points than they disagreed." Instead of rejecting the Constitution
outright, they temporized by resolving to await a bill of rights.
To emphasize the temporary nature of their solution, the delegates
approved two additional resolutions, both of which appealed to even the
most enthusiastic supporters of the Constitution, indicating North Carolina's willingness to respond favorably, albeit later, to the new constitutional government." The first resolution addressed the most pressing need
for a source of income for the national government. The convention recommended, "by a large majority," that as soon as Congress enacted an
impost on imported goods, the state legislature should impose the same
impost and appropriate the receipts to Congress."' The other resolution
addressed the greatest perceived evil created by the state governments
under the Confederation. The convention unanimously recommended
that the legislature make every effort to redeem the state's paper money
as soon as possible." Those resolutions reveal the substantial agreement
on the need for a national government with greater powers than under
the Articles of Confederation.1 2 Beneath the creative expedience of the
7.
8.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 15.
On the similarities between the Federalists and Antifederalists, see C. KENYON, THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS xxvii-xxix (1966). For additional discussion of the positions of the Antifed-

eralists, see J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 (1961);
Storing, What the Antifederalists Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981). Suggestive of the paucity of commentary from North Carolina is the fact that
none of the selections in Storing's four volumes is from North Carolina.
9. For examples of the effect of these resolutions, see Massachusetts Hist. Soc., George
Thatcher Papers, George Thatcher to Mrs. George (Sarah) Thatcher (Sept. 16, 1788) (North
Carolina passed two resolves "much to their honour."); Pennsylvania Hist. Soc., Gratz Collection, John Swann to James Iredell (Sept. 21, 1788) ("I now have the pleasure to assure
you that her [North Carolina's] conduct is considered in a much less censorious light. The
resolutions passed by the Convention were too [conclusive?] of a federal disposition at least,
not to have had considerable influence in changing the public opinion."); Southern Historical Collection, John Rutledge Papers, John Brown Cutting to John Rutledge, Jr. (Oct. 9,
1788) ("To manifest however their affection for the Union and zeal for national credit and
honor" North Carolina passed the two resolutions).
10. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 251. For a discussion of the important divisions
over the question of an impost under the Articles of Confederation, see J. MAIN, supra note
8, at 72-84.

11.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 1, at 251-52.

12. For a contemporaneous, though anonymous, view of the different positions, see A
North Carolina Citizen on the Federal Constitution, 1788, 16 N.C. HIST. REV. 36 (Boyd ed.
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convention's solution, however, lay historical and radical differences between the Federalists and the Antifederalists.
THE BACKGROUND

One key to understanding the differences between the Federalists
and the Antifederalists lies in the realization that the debate over the
Constitution was primarily a debate about law. However much might be
learned from an economic, social, or other adjectival analysis of the debates, the delegates were first and foremost talking about law,"3 about
which they had a fundamental disagreement. For the Antifederalists, law
was politics. As such, it was subject to the usually beneficial, though
sometimes malevolent, influences of shifting majorities in any assemblage.
On the one hand, the law might be the ameliorative considerations of a
jury deciding in favor of "justice" rather than "the law."14 But, on the
other hand, it might be the demands of a legislature that taxes be paid in
specie which was dear rather than commodities which were abundant. For
the Antifederalists, the solution required to minimize any injurious tendencies was to make the law ever more the customary sense of a small
and homogenous community, avoiding the need for commands from a distant legislature wherever possible. 15 Only by retaining its smallness could
a community hope to maintain the homogeneity necessary to maximize
the beneficial effects of "law" at the expense of the political evil.
By contrast, for the Federalists, the law offered a means of controlling politics. Rather than the rough-and-tumble, kaleidoscopic justice of
custom, the Federalists sought a more predictable and more certain result
which could come only from a legal system which placed limits on the
many competing interests, each seeking advantage in a temporary
1939).
13. See 2 MCREE'S IREDELL, supra note 2, at 148 (Iredell wrote in 1786 under the
pseudonym "An Elector": No one will "den[y] the constitution [of North Carolina] is a law,"
to be sure the "fundamental law", but a law nonetheless.)
14. It might also be a justice of the peace, untrained in law as most of them were,
deciding according to his own perception of the community's interest. See J. DAVIS, THE
112 (Newbern 1784) (book intended for
"the unlearned Reader"); J. Boyd, The County Court in Colonial North Carolina 39-40 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Duke University 1926) (types of laws administered by the county
courts) [hereinafter Boyd's MA thesis]. For much of the eighteenth century there were also
many lawyers who had little knowledge of the law. A. EKIRCH, "POOR CAROLINA": POLITICS
OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

1729-1776 at 25, 27 (1981).
15. Cf. Ekirch, "A New Government of Liberty": Hermon Husband's Vision of
Bachcountry North Carolina, 1755, 34 WMI. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 632 (1977) (Hermon Husband's 1755 letter to Lord Granville). "For Husband prosperity and social stability depended upon a structure of social relationships which provided maximum economic opportunities for small freeholders." M. Jones, Hermon Husband: Millenarian, Carolina
Regulator, and Whiskey Rebel 73 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois UniverAND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA,

sity 1982). See also id. at 149 (Three regulator petitions of 1769 "set forth a vision: of a
democratic society in which small freeholders would instruct assemblymen and decide legal

disputes without the aid of lawyers."); H.

WAGSTAFF,

supra note 5, at 15.
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majority."l
Both the Federalists and the Antifederalists shared a long history of
debate about law in North Carolina. For much of that history they also
shared the view that law was politics. The early disputes between the legislators and the royal governor closely resembled the later efforts by the
Antifederalists to preserve local government against the most venal predicted effect of the proposed Constitution - "consolidation. 1 7 To a significant degree, the difference between the colonial disputes and the later
constitutional arguments was the replacement of royal authority by the
Federalists."'
For the Antifederalists and their predecessors the primary goal was
to resist the imposition of "law" by a distant authority, whether it be the
colonial assembly sitting in a coastal town or the constitutional congress
sitting even further away. In contrast, the antecedents of the Federalists
lay in the nationalist faction that had begun in North Carolina by 1783.10
This faction arose from an emerging distrust of the state legislatures,
which seemed all too subject to transitory control by interests unappreciative of the need for consistent legislation. In place of the thirteen
mercurial legislatures, the Federalists hoped to put a national congress.
But even more important for an understanding of the debate in North
Carolina, the Federalists hoped to enact a set of laws that would provide
certainty and stability in the place of the laws that the Antifederalists
and local interests perceived as being equitable and just.
That the two sides were not always consistent in their arguments or
in their membership is not surprising. As the legal and political systems
developed during the colonial period, legal arguments were often selected
based upon the need to justify a particular outcome.2 0 In spite of the chameleon-like quality of the debate, it is clear that for much of the colonial
period most colonists adhered to the notion that law was custom. 2 That
16. As Merrill Jensen notes, this was not a new idea, it had been popular through
much of the eighteenth century. M. JENSEN, supra note 5, at iii n.8. For a study of gradual
efforts to implement similar thoughts in North Carolina, see S. Koesy, Continuity and
Change in North Carolina, 1775-1789 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University
1963).
17. See, e.g., Sellers, Making a Revolution: The North Carolina Whigs, 1765-1775, in
STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY 23 (J. Sitterson ed. 1957) (vol. 39 James Sprunt Studies in
History and Political Science).
18. Id.
19. 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL lXXVi (D. Higginbotham ed. 1976) [hereinafter
HIGGINBOTHAM'S IREDELL].

See also S. Koesy, supra note 16, at 116-37, 161-69.

20. Cf. A. EKIRCH, supra note 14, at 79 ("For the most part, constitutional differences,
when they did arise, seem to have masked more fundamental conflicts.")
21. Cf.C. RAPER, NORTH CAROLINA: A STUDY IN ENGLISH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 222-23
(1904). For an early example, see the enactment of the General Assembly in 1715 declaring

that the laws of England were "the [lI]aws of this Government, so far as they are compatable
[sic] with our Way of Living and Trade." Act of 1715, ch. 31, § 5, 1821 N.C. Laws ch. 5, § 1,
23 SRNC, supra note 1, at 39. A similar act was passed in 1749. Id. at 327. The later act was
disallowed by an Order in Council in 1754. H. Taylor, Creditor vs. Debtor: A Study of the
Statutory, Administrative, and Procedural Aspects of Debt Recovery in Colonial North Carolina (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1972); cf.
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is, for most colonists the primary source of law was the habit of the local
community; it was what they had unconsciously done for years gone by.
Law was not the enactment of a sovereign, at any location.
In fact, North Carolina had a purer experience with small, local governments than any other state. The unique characteristics of that shared
colonial history were that North Carolina
had few slaves, no plantation aristocracy, no centers of commerce and
culture .... [Its] preoccupation with local problems - conflicts between settlers and Indians, between east and west, between assemblies
and governors - combined with geographic and cultural isolation to
give North Carolina a uniquely parochial character at a time when
causing other colonies to develop a more American
events were
22
outlook.
Alone among the states, as of 1787, North Carolina had not developed a
substantial commercial center, or a city of any size for that matter. North
Carolina did not even have what could properly be called a permanent
capital. (One of the tasks of the Hillsborough Convention was to fix the
site for a capital.)2 3 In short, as one resident wrote in about 1770, North
24
Carolina was "the Best poor mans Country I Ever heard of."
The consequence of North Carolina's experience was to make even
more substantial the inevitably important role of local government
throughout the colonial period and early years of independence. From the
earliest decades of the colony's existence the local government was the
county court. 25 Even as late as 1767, when Governor Tryon described the
government of the colony, his report focused almost exclusively on the
courts. 26 That government, as Michael Kay has described it
was highly personalized. It was not composed of office holders who were
remote from the people and were paid out of public funds earmarked
for such expenses, but of men who resided in the midst of the inhabitants, gained most of their living as private citizens, and were paid for
their public duties primarily by direct collections from the people in

17 n.(a) (1791).
22. Klein & Cooke, Introduction to H. LEFLER & W. POWELL, supra note 5, at xiii; id.
at 153, 174-76; Newsome, supra note 6, at 295 (reasons for initial refusal of ratification). It
was in precisely this kind of isolation that Jackson Turner Main finds the origins of antifederalism. J. MAIN, supra note 8,at 7, 274. The most recent scholarly study of eighteenthcentury North Carolina is A. EKIRCH, supra note 14. On the point mentioned in text,
Ekirch's second chapter is especially useful. See id. at 19-47.
23. For the various resolutions and disputes on this task in the convention, see 22
SRNC, supra note 1, at 26-35.
24. Quoted in A. EKIRCH, supra note 14, at 29.
25. Boyd's MA thesis, supra note 14, at vii. See also PAUL MCCAIN, THE COUNTY
COURT IN NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1750, at v (1954) (Trinity College Hist. Soc. Papers ser.
31) ("For almost two hundred years before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 the
county court was the principal institution of local government in North Carolina.")
26. North Carolina State Archives, Governors Letter Books, No. 1, Governor Tryon to
the Earl of Shelburne (June 29, 1767), reprintedin 7 CRNC,supra note 5, at 472.
J. IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
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the form of fees and commissions.2"
With virtually every aspect of government influenced in some way by
these local courts, the colonists saw from the start that the same judges
who decided criminal and civil disputes also administered local government. There was little concept that any judicial function should be separate from an administrative function, certainly not at this lowest level of
colonial government. In fact, even though the entity was termed a
"court," it was not uncommon for administrative matters, those
concerning roads, mills and the like, to take precedence over judicial matters.2 s
The political process that led to the selection of the justice of the peace
was therefore the same process whether one wanted to be a judge or an
administrator. Thus, it is no wonder that for the decided majority of colonial North Carolinians, law and politics were indistinct.
As a consequence, when local disputes took on a political tone, they
frequently concentrated upon the county court. Not infrequently those
disputes were taken to the legislature, whose members were often the
same people who were justices of the peace or other officials at the county
level.2 9 In the early colonial years the members of the legislature stood
substantially united; most often they reflected the views of the colonists
in disputes with the crown or its local representative, the royal governor.3 0
One of the earliest occasions for dispute about the nature of law was
the arrival of a new governor, Gabriel Johnston, in the colony in 1734.
Shortly afterward, the grand jury of the province (the colony not being
large enough yet to have more than a single grand jury) prepared an address in which it complained that it could find no law requiring that the
quit rents due the crown be paid in a particular currency or at places
designated by the governor. Instead, the grand jurors contended, it had
"always been the Custom, Time out of Mind, to pay" the rents on the
land in question, the grand jurors therefore concluded, equating custom
and habit with "law," that to require otherwise was "contrary to the Laws
and Usages of this Province. 3 1 The colonists were perfectly capable of
basing their argument on a written document - in this instance, the
27. M. Kay, The Institutional Background to the Regulation in Colonial North Carolina (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota 1962). On the colonial government in general, see W. GuEss, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA (1911)
(vol. 11 James Sprunt Hist. Publications); C. RAPER, supra note 21.
28. Boyd's MA thesis, supra note 14, at 29; see also J. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 322-29.
29. Cf. Boyd's MA thesis, supra note 14, at 19, 177-78.
30. For accounts of the ebb and flow of factionalism in the North Carolina General
Assembly, see A. EKIRCH, supra note 14.
31. South Carolina Gazette, July 26-Aug. 2, 1735. For an account of the origins of the
dispute and its eventual compromise, see A. EKIRCH, supra note 14, at 86-111; H. LEFLER &
W. POWELL, supra note 5, at 116-21; London, The Representation Controversy in Colonial
North Carolina, 11 N.C. HIsT. REV. 255, 256-58 (1934). For a discussion of this and other
disputes see James Huhta, Government by Instruction: North Carolina, 1731-1776. A Study
of the Influence of the Royal Instructions on the Major Controversies between the Governor
and the Lower House (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill 1965).
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deed to the proprietors in 1668 (the "Great Deed of Grant") - but their
preference was apparent in their argument that any requirement of payment in sterling was "contrary to our Laws, Customs, and even to the
Conditions of the Grand-Deed. '32 In this debate it was the royal governor
who sought support in a written law. The royal governor characterized
the "grand deed" as "but a temporary Letter of Attorney" which had
been revoked.33 Any "laws" that might exist were only those approved by
the proper authority in England. Since he could find no such law that
supported the colonists' position, he concluded that they were obligated
to pay quit rents according to his proclamation.3
One of the difficulties faced by the colonists was that in the absence
of adequate printing facilities, no printed documents were readily circulated and available, not even the enactments of the legislature.3 5 Governor Gabriel Johnston, who preferred certainty of the law, regularly complained to the Assembly that he could not "find one compleat [sic] Copy
of the Laws; [neither had he] seen two Copies that agree."3 6 The Assembly conceded that there was a problem and even admitted that it might
not have been as careful as it should in wording certain statutes. But, it
did not view the problem as overly significant, for, after all, law was what
the people had become accustomed to doing; they knew the law because
they lived it every day. Thus the Assembly believed that "the Sense and
Meaning of the honest Law-makers [was] sufficiently expressed."3 7 Furthermore, the Assembly saw little to be gained from a precise expression
of certain laws since the only result had been that "a Person of great
Learning" had criticized certain paragraphs and then taken six or seven
times the fees authorized by law.38 To these members of the Assembly,
the definite, written law represented only the imposition of an outside
32. South Carolina Gazette, Aug. 2-9, 1735.
33. Id., July 26-Aug. 2, 1735.
34. Id., Aug. 9, 1735 (address at prorogation of Assembly). Citizens of western counties
would later use very similar language in protests against the Assembly's requirement that
taxes be paid in specie rather than in commodities. 8 CRNC, supra note 5, at 75-80; North
Carolina Archives, Legislative Papers Nov.-Dec. 1768, Petition from Inhabitants of Orange
and Rowan Counties (regarding grievances over sinking fund tax).
35. For early examples of laws aimed at correcting this problem in the courts, see Act
of 1749, ch. 4, 23 SRNC, supra note 1, at 346 (1749 statute authorizing county courts to
purchase certain law books); Act of 1715, ch. 66, § 15, 23 SRNC, supra note 1, at 94-96

(1715 statute requiring county court clerks to make laws of province available to judges and
parties). For other acts authorizing collection and printing of statutes, see Act of 1746, ch. 1,
23 SRNC, supra note 1, at 268 (act appointing commissioners to revise and print the laws of
the colony); Act of 1748, ch. 7, 23 SRNC, supra note 1, at 308; Act of 1749, ch. 6, 23 SRNC,
supra note 1, at 332.
36. South Carolina Gazette, May 21-28, 1737; see also id., Mar. 1, 1739 (complaint
that laws were "dispersed in a few obscure incorrect Copies"); id., Apr. 11-19, 1740 (relates
that in Governor Johnston's travels throughout the colony he had met many who complained of the lack of copies of laws).
37. Id., May 28, 1737. Just over three decades later, Hermon Husband wrote a similar
argument in favor of jurors being able to interpret the laws. Hermon Husband's Continuation of the Impartial Relation, 18 N.C. HIsT. REv. 48, 58 (1941).
38. South Carolina Gazette, May 21-28, 1737.
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authority; they saw no reason to favor such an authority.
A later dispute concerning custom arose within the Governor's Council itself in 1739. The occasion for the dispute was a proposal to change
the name of Newton to Wilmington. After all eight members of the Council cast votes, they found that they had split evenly, 4-4. 39 The senior
member then claimed the right to cast another vote to break the tie,
which he did. 40 The four members who thereby became the losing minority responded with a written protest based on custom. 41 The minority argued that there was no precedent for such action "in any of his Majesty's
Colonies in America since the first Settlement of them. ' 42 The importance of the departure from precedent was evident in their conclusion:
We conceive, that where a Right is so strongly asserted as in this
Case, it behoves the Parties asserting that Right to produce some Instances parallel to it, either at Home or abroad, in support of that Assertion, in order to regulate our Judgment and determine our Opinions
in the Case; [since the only precedent was one in which a divided vote
led to the failure of the proposal,] it is plain we conceive, that the present Claim of the first Counsellor is an Innovation and destructive to
the Rights of the Upper House, which we are
determined as far as in us
43
lies to leave unviolated to our Successors.
In the following decades, the legal system of the colony continued to
develop, as did the controversy between the colonists and the crown.
There even began to be splits among the colonists. One of the earliest
splits was evidenced by a petition from Anson County in 1769 complaining that "Lawyers, Clerks, and other pentioners [sic]; in place of being obsequious Servants for the Country's use are become a nuisance, as
the business of the people is often transactedwithout the least degree of
fairness, the intention of the law evaded.""" For those colonists at least,
lawyers represented the law's growing rigidity, which increasingly set the
law against customary concepts of fairness and justice.
The localized nature of custom was evident also in later disputes during which some colonists began to refine their position by rejecting any
custom that was not their own. In those circumstances, they argued that
their own colonial legislature should be allowed to enact a statute to make
the law certain. The key example of refinement of the colonists' position
occurred in the dispute between the Assembly and the governor over an
attachment provision in the colony's law. 45 "Attachment" is a process by
39. Id. July 2-9, 1740.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 8 CRNC, supra note 5, at 76 (emphasis added).
45. For further discussion on this dispute, see generally 1 S. ASHE, supra note 1, at
408-414; Taylor, The Foreign Attachment Law and the Coming of the Revolution in North
Carolina, 52 N.C. HIsT. REV. 20 (1975); H. Taylor, supra note 20, at 177-211; Sellers, supra
note 17, at 27-30.
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which a creditor, who is unable to obtain repayment of a debt, can enlist
the aid of a court in seizing sufficient assets of the debtor to secure payment. 46 The ostensible concern of the North Carolinians was debt owed

them by people who lived in England and did business in North Carolina.47 Because the debtors themselves never came to the colony, the creditors could not have them personally seized to enforce a debt. The only
recourse the colonial creditors had was to obtain a court's order to seize
and later to sell assets owned by the English debtor. If the process for
obtaining a court order required that the English debtor answer the suit,
the difficulty of transatlantic communication meant
that any effort to re48
cover debts would be dramatically prolonged.
The colonists therefore preferred an attachment provision that allowed a court to issue an order (a "writ of attachment") directing the
sheriff to seize certain property of the debtor. The only requirement of
that law was that the sheriff first report that the debtor could not be
found within his jurisdiction - and of course it surprised no one that a
resident of England could not be found in a North Carolina county.49 The
essence of the law was to enable the colonists to proceed more easily
against the assets of English debtors, much to the disadvantage of the
debtors. Understandably, English merchants pressured the crown to disallow any attachment provision. Both sides refused to concede, with the
result that after the court law expired in 1773, the colony had no judicial
system until 1777 when the state legislature re-created the system.5 0
During the dispute between the Assembly and the governor, the recognition of custom as flexible and serving a local interest reappeared. On
this occasion, though, the colonists spurned any concept of custom that
recognized a transnational basis for its authority. The colonists rejected
the attachment practices in England as being no more than the custom of
municipalities.5" Such practices were "confined to Liberties and
Franchises governed by particular Circumstances of Place and People,
46.

For a contemporaneous explanation of the law, see J. DAvis, supra note 14, at 22-

26.
47. For a discussion of the problems associated with transatlantic debt collection, see
H. Taylor, supra note 21, at 30-34.
48. The efforts would have been prolonged under a bill proposed by the Council,
which required twelve months notice to the debtor. 9 CRNC, supra note 5, at 558-59. As
Ashe explained, the House refused to approve because the proposal "was an innovation in
law and usage which had ever prevailed in the province." 1 S. ASHE, supra note 1, at 408.
49. There was also complaint that the law was used unfairly to seize the assets of
North Carolina merchants when they were away from home. Instructions to Orange County
Representatives (1773), 9 CRNC,supra note 5, at 701-04; Boyd's MA thesis, supra note 14,
at 146-47.
50.

Act of 1777, ch. 2, 1821 N.C. Laws 282, ch. 115, reprintedin 24 SRNC, supra note

1, at 48.
51. Alexander Elmsly wrote from London to Samuel Johnston that in the City of
London and certain other "old" towns, attachment lay by custom. Southern Historical Collection, Hayes Papers (Johnston Family Series), Elmsly to Johnston (May 17, 1774). In this
letter Elmsly also explained the origins of the most recent instruction to the royal governor
concerning the attachment provisions. Id.
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and so essentially local in the Application of them, as not to admit to
being extended by any Analogy to this Province."5" The Assembly also
rejected any contention that the judges might interpret the law and adapt
it to the province. Their reasoning reflected both their mistrust of judges
appointed by the royal governor and their understanding of statutory law
as a check on the discretionary flexibility of custom: "to secure a Privilege
so important, the Mode of obtaining it should be grounded in Certainty,
the Law positive and express, and nothing left for the exercise of Doubt
'53
and Discretion.
The Assembly's argument also revealed another aspect of the changing debate. Once the colony began to develop commercially, it also had
need for a more certain law, "positive and express," than was required in
the earlier years of the colony. Into the 1770s, the colony retained its
sense of fundamental difference between custom and statute. But, the
colony had begun to change sufficiently to make an appeal to statute attractive to some interests. Custom was the law of equity, the law that
decided each case according to the perceived justice of its facts. Statutory
law was the law of rules, the law that decided each case in a predictable
manner so that, in particular, commerce could develop with regularity. In
the 1780s the distinction between custom and statute would reappear
under the guise of the dispute between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. To the Antifederalists, written law represented the intrusion of
both law and commerce from outside the small, local community; it represented the loss of local control of justice. To the Federalists, written law
was the epitome of what was required for ordered growth and
development.
THE CONVENTION

The proceedings of the Hillsborough convention resonated with those
historical differences. No sooner had the Federalists proposed to discuss
the Constitution clause-by-clause (as had been done in each state which
had not ratified the Constitution unanimously) than the Antifederalists
objected. According to Willie Jones, the leader of the Antifederalists, everyone had had enough time to study the Constitution. Every delegate
was doubtless ready to vote. 54 Jones' lieutenant, Thomas Person, echoed
that belief in seconding a motion to vote immediately.5
The Federalists were aghast at the thought that there would be no
deliberations." Yet even their leader, James Iredell, recognized that the
Antifederalists were correct as a matter of fact. The Constitution had
been a topic of considerable discussion for more than nine months, since
52. South Carolina Gazette, March 29, 1773.
53. Id.
54. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 4. For further commentary about Willie Jones,
see Robinson, Willie Jones of Halifax, 18 N.C. HIST. REv. 1, 133 (1941).
55. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 4.
56. Id. at 4-6.
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September of 1787.57 The delegates themselves had known for over three
months that they were to attend the convention." And, of course, there
had been an even longer time to consider any perceived weaknesses in the
Articles of Confederation. No delegate came to Hillsborough uninformed. 9 The initial skirmishes at the convention therefore did not reflect a dispute about the factual question of how much additional time
was required for the delegates to consider the Constitution. Instead, the
debate grew out of a fundamental disagreement about the proper role for
the delegates to a convention. This disagreement, in turn, reflected the
long-standing and basic differences of opinion about the proper nature of
law and government. According to the Antifederalists, the delegates assembled to cast the vote directed by their constituents. As William Lancaster, an Antifederalist from Franklin County, explained later in the
convention, "every delegate was bound by their instructions."' 0 Or, as
Lancaster also said, he and every other delegate was "bound by the voice
of the people."6 1 Iredell's response for the Federalists could not have afforded greater contrast: "We have been sent hither, by the people, to consider and decide this important business for them."' 2 Recognizing the
fundamental nature of the disagreement over Willie Jones' motion to vote
immediately, Iredell devoted substantial time to his answer. He explained
that he might vote against the Constitution even though his constituents
had elected him with the expectation that he would vote for it. 3 Iredell
avowed that he would feel no embarrassment in returning to his home
and reporting that he had been convinced by the arguments of those at
the convention.
But Iredell's assurance was in itself frightful to the Antifederalists. It
provided immediate evidence of the dangers anticipated from a govern57. For example, Davie wrote Iredell early in 1788 and commented upon the develop-

ing discussion of "Anti-federal principles." Duke University Archives, Iredell Papers, Davie
to Iredell (Jan. 22, 1788). Davie also wrote to Hugh Williamson that "a formidable party"

had begun to form against the constitution. Free Library of Philadelphia, Hampton L. Carson Collection, Davie to Williamson (Feb. 12, 1788). See also Rhode Island Historical Soci-

ety, Henry Marchant Papers, Silas Cooke to Henry Marchant, New Bern (Apr. 20, 1788)
("The new constitution is the grand subject of speculation here at present, the [people] are

much divided upon it. ..
at 21-23.

")

Cf. S.BoYD, supra note 5, at 110; H. WAGSTAFF, supra note 5,

58. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 13-14.

59. Cf. A North Carolina Citizen, supra note 12, at 36, 38-40 (unidentified author
describes discussion of constitution in spring or summer of 1788); Newsome, supra note 6, at

289.
60.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 1, at 215.

61. Id. The use of instructions in North Carolina had a short history, dating from the

Regulator movement two decades earlier. E. DOUGLAS,

REBELS AND DEMOCRATS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

115 (1955).
62. ELLIoT's

DEBATES,

supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added). For an account of the

development of similar differences in previous decades, see D. Blower, The Orange County
and Mecklenburg County Instructions: The Development of Political Individualism in

Backcountry North Carolina, 1740-1776 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan 1984).
63. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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ment operating at a distance from its constituents, a government that
necessarily would comprise heterogeneous interests. If Iredell's position
held, delegates might go from North Carolina to meet with delegates from
very different areas, such as New England, and be convinced (Willie
Jones and his followers would say "corrupted") to vote against the wishes
of their constituents. Iredell's position was all the more foreboding since
the North Carolina convention would last but a few weeks at most, while
delegates to Congress would remain away for much longer periods of
time. Members of the House of Representatives would remain away for as
much as ten years, forewarned Joseph McDowell, Antifederalist delegate
from Burke County. "At such a distance from their homes," he predicted,
"and for so long a time, they will have no feeling for, nor any knowledge
of, the situation of the people."( 4 The order of his statement was suggestive of the basic Antifederalist position that law was equity: "feeling for"
the people took precedence over "knowledge."
The lack of contact with the people was all the more troubling for
McDowell and others of his fellow Antifederalists from the western part
of the state because they anticipated that the congressional delegates
would be chosen from residents of the seaboard.' 5 Easterners would "not
know of the western part of the country, and," McDowell admitted, "vice
versa." 6 According to Antifederalist Joseph Taylor of Granville County,
the expanse of the thirteen states was simply too large for the "consolidated" government envisioned by the Constitution. 7 The delegates from
the western counties spoke from their own experience with insignificant
representation in the various colonial and state assemblies. For example,
in 1774 one of Governor Burke's correspondents noted that there was an
inconsistency between complaints about inadequate representation in
Parliament and the unequal treatment of the western counties in the
meeting in Halifax that year. "It is not in character to dispute the power
of Parliament," he wrote, "when we say we are not represented and yet
quickly to submit to so unequal a representation in a body formed by
ourselves." 68
If the delegates from North Carolina could not know the interests of
different sections of their own state, it was inevitable that "men who
come from New England [were] different from us. They are ignorant of
our situation; they do not know the state of our country. They cannot
64. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 88. Davie provided an illustration of the closeness of the two positions when he explained that in the federal convention the North Carolina delegation had argued for limiting the president to a single term of four or five years.
The "return of public officers into the common mass of the people, where they would feel
the tone they had given to the administration of the laws, was the best security the public
had for their good behavior." Id. at 103. Davie also thought it unlikely that even Senators
could remain in office for more than one term. Id. at 122-23.

65. Id. at 70, 88.
66. Id. at 88.
67. Id. at 24.
68. North Carolina State Archives, Governors Letter Books, no. 3, Andrew Miller to
Burke (Sept. 4, 1774).
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with safety legislate for us."' 9 Judge Samuel Spencer of Anson County,
the leading debater for the Antifederalists, nicely summarized their
position:
...[firom all the notions which we have concerning our happiness
and well-being, the state governments are the basis of our happiness,
security, and property. A large extent of country ought to be divided
into such a number of states as that the people may conveniently carry
on their own government. This will render the government perfectly
agreeable to the genius and wishes of the people. If the United States
were to consist of ten times as many states, they might all have a degree of harmony. Nothing would be wanting but some cement for their
connection. On the contrary, if all the United States were to be swallowed up by the great mass of powers given to Congress, the parts that
are more distant in this great empire would be governed with less and
less energy. It would not suit the genius of the people to assist in the
government."
But, however much the Federalists tried, they could not budge the
Antifederalists from their basic apprehension. The irrepressible Archibald
Maclaine, representing the town of Wilmington, pointed out unavailingly
that the "members of the general government, and those of the state legislature, are both chosen by the people. ' 71 And, he asked rhetorically, "If
the elections be regulated in the best manner in the state government,
can it be supposed that the same man will lose all his virtue, his character
and principles, when he goes into the general government, in order to
deprive us of our liberty? ' 72 Likewise, William R. Davie, the Federalist
delegate from the town of Halifax who had represented the state in the
convention in Philadelphia, countered Judge Spencer's observation with
the statement that the "people of the United States have one common
interest; they are all members of the same community. '73 The fundamental disagreement over the nature of government and of representation
went unresolved as the delegates agreed "by a great majority" to discuss
74
the Constitution clause-by-clause.
But the convention immediately stalled again over another fundamental disagreement. Reverend David Caldwell, Antifederalist from
Guilford County, proposed six maxims which he described as the "fundamental principles of every safe and free government."7 5 He urged the con69.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 24 (Joseph Taylor).

70. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 51. For a general discussion of this argument,
see J. MAIN, supra note 8, at 127-30. According to Cecelia Kenyon, the "most elaborate
explanation" of that position came from Melancton Smith in the New York convention.
Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 Whf. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 3, 11 (1955).
71.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 69.

72. Id.

73. Id. at 157. For further commentary about William R. Davie, see B. ROBINSON,
LIAM

R. DAVIE (1957).
74. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 15.

75. Id. at 9. The complete list of the principles was:

WIL-

1987]

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

vention to accept them and then to use them as a litmus test to determine whether the Constitution was fit for adoption. Not all of the
Antifederalists agreed with Caldwell's tests. (Judge Spencer, for example,
disagreed with at least one.) 76 But the tests did provide additional exam-

ples of the fundamental split between the Antifederalists and the
Federalists.
Caldwell's first maxim was that a "government is a compact between
the rulers and the people." '7 The notion of a "compact" was unique to
neither Caldwell nor the Antifederalists, but it did reveal a telling anachronism in their thought. Fifteen years earlier Iredell himself had used the
same argument, though about the British crown. "[T]he constitution of
this country [North Carolina]," he had written, "is founded on the provincial charter, which may well be considered as the original contract between the King and the inhabitants; [the governor's commission is like] a
special letter of attorney, impowering and directing the Governor
in what
'78
manner to execute that contract on the part of the King.
Although Caldwell would later retreat somewhat from his characterization,71 he and other delegates regularly referred to the need to protect
the people from the "rulers" who would be set up by the Constitution. 0
The choice of term was pejorative, recalling as it did the British monarch
from whom the country had so recently rebelled. For the Antifederalists,
any additional layer of government beyond the homogeneous, small community was an admission of failure. To add the overlay was to add "rulers" and was to admit that the people could not govern themselves. Furthermore, the additional layer of government necessarily required "rules"
which also contradicted the more equitable process that the Antifederalists envisioned.The Federalists countered by arguing that this first maxim
indicated that the Antifederalists had not yet accepted the revolutionary
dogma that the people themselves were sovereign.81 But Caldwell's Antifederalist companion from Guilford County, William Goudy, made it
1st. A government is a compact between the rulers and the people. 2d. Such a
compact ought to be lawful in itself. 3d. It ought to be lawfully executed. 4th.
Unalienable rights ought not to be given up, if not necessary. 5th. The compact
ought to be mutual. And, 6th, It ought to be plain, obvious, and easily
understood.

Id.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 9. See generally Buel, Democracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of
Reference, 21 WM.& MARY Q. (3d ser.) 165 (1964).
78. 1 HIGGINBOTHAM'S IREDELL, supra note 19, at 164. Iredell frequently repeated that

argument in the years before the Declaration of Independence. See, e.g., id. at 26-62 ("To
the Inhabitants of Great Britain" 1774); 331 ("The Principles of an American Whig" 17751776); 339-40 (June 1776).
79. ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 1, at 12.
80. E.g., id. at 10, 137, 167.
81. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9-10. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 364-65 (1969) (describing distinction between the people

and all elected officials).
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clear that they were not interested in a lawyer's "quibble upon words." 2
They were concerned about practical politics. The concession that a community needed rulers only introduced an additional likelihood of an
abuse of power. "[I]f rulers be not well guarded," Goudy stated, "that
power [of the people] may be usurped from them.

' s3

Thomas Burke,

North Carolina's quintessential democrat, had epitomized the same view
a decade earlier when he wrote from the Confederation Congress to Governor Caswell: "The more experience I acquire, the stronger is my conviction, that unlimited power cannot be safely entrusted to any man, or set
of men, on earth.'1 4 Burke continued his letter with the observation "that
Power of all kinds has an irresistible propensity to increase a desire for
itself. It gives the passion of ambition a velocity which increases in its
progress; and this is a passion which grows in proportion as it is gratified."8 5 Those statements echoed the warning of "Honestus" in the Wilmington Centinel just before the convention met. He reported that "all
the people of the ancient republics lost their liberty by being too liberal
in bestowing too much power to their chosen leaders, though ever so virtuous and disinterested in their private life and situations, but when once
granted, it is not so easily to be altered or recalled."8 "
Caldwell's second maxim was equally significant. It provided that the
Constitution itself should be "lawful. 81 7 The idea grew out of the concept
that social mores, or custom, could be used to criticize the law; that equity could soften any harsh rules of "law." The maxim's phrasing recalled
a debate in the First Continental Congress over an appeal to natural law.
The radicals in that Congress were Caldwell's predecessors: both saw
merit in an appeal to some basis outside the legal system for the security
of legal rights. Both were confronted by a more conservative group who
saw in law an authority in itself, without an appeal to some other authority. Indicative of the Federalist reply in North Carolina was one of the
"Instructions to Chowan County Representatives" in September 1783,
which the editor of Iredell's papers suggests was written by Iredell himself. The text instructed the delegates to secure permanent salaries for
the judges and the attorney general. In the absence of permanent salaries
the officials "cannot be truly independent, which is a point of the utmost
moment in a Republic where the Law is superior to any or all the Individuals, and the Constitution superior even to the Legislature."8 To the Antifederalists it was inconceivable that law could be superior to "all the
Individuals." The individuals, in their small, homogeneous communities,
82.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note

1, at 10.

83. Id.
84. North Carolina State Archives, Governors Letter Books, no. 1.1, Burke to Caswell
(Mar. 11, 1777) (emphasis in original). See generally J. MAIN, supra note 8, at 127.

85. North Carolina State Archives, Governors Letter Books, no. 1.1, Burke to Caswell
(March 11, 1777).
86. June 18, 1788, "To the People of the State of North Carolina."
87.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note

1, at 9.

88. See M. JENSEN, supra note 5, at 60.
89. 2

HIGGINBOTHAM'S IREDELL,

supra note 19, at 449.
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were the law.
Iredell's concept had prior application in discussions about the North
Carolina Constitution of 1776. In 1784 Samuel Johnston described the
government of the state for a friend. One of the characteristics that he
thought preferable in the North Carolina government to all previous governments was the fact that:
our Constitution which existed before the Government and which created and regulated it is considered in the Nature of a Charter not to be
violated and every Law, made contrary to or inconsistent with the principles laid down and marked by it, is considered absolutely void and
not binding on the Citizens, this [illegible] is a kind of Security for the
Stability of our Government without which our affairs would be in such
a State of fluctuation as must eventually produce Anarchy.90
Johnston had no reason to allow an appeal to anything outside the Constitution; to do so would produce what he termed "fluctuation" and assuredly "anarchy." To the Antifederalists an appeal outside the written law
produced equity, so long as the community was small enough to remain
homogeneous.
The difference between the Antifederalists and the Federalists suggested by Caldwell's second maxim provided the basis for additional disputes later in the convention. For the moment, however, the convention
was content to drop the issue, but the two positions remained. On the one
hand the Antifederalists saw law as equity, which had two consequences.
First, they saw law, whether written or customary, as a flexible tool to be
crafted to fit the equity of the moment. Second, because any law, even a
constitution, was so flexible, there was a particular need for explicit restrictions in any written document. Without such restrictions, the lust for
power inherent in human nature would permit the "rulers" to abuse the
flexibility of the law. On the other hand, the Federalists saw law as a
system of rules that, in itself, provided the limits to power. The government, being the creature of the Constitution, could not act outside the
creating force. There was no need, in the eyes of the Federalists, for Caldwell's rules or for any other statements of limitation on the powers of the
government.
The convention sensed that there was nothing to be gained from further discussion of Caldwell's maxims. Accordingly, (we are told it was after "some little altercation")91 the convention at last began to consider
the Constitution section-by-section. What followed was, at times, little
more than a parody of a debate. The Antifederalists said little; the Federalists provided both point and counterpoint, first stating a criticism and
90. Southern Historical Collection, Hayes Collection (Johnston Family Series), Johnston to Alexander Scrysmoure, July 11, 1784. An undated fragment of an argument contains
similar phrasing. Id., folder 107. Johnston made a similar argument within the convention.
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 64. See also 2 McRFE's IREDELL, supra note 2, at 145,

"To the Public" (Aug. 17, 1786). The statements may seem to anticipate judicial review;
Iredell's address certainly did so. See id. at 145-49.
91.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 13.
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then 2offering a rebuttal. After some initial sarcasm from the Antifederalists,0 the convention settled into a pattern of long speeches by the Federalists, with short interjections by the Antifederalists. More often than
not, however, the debaters talked past one another. The fundamentally
different premises prevented any chance for persuasion.
THE PREAMBLE

Before the convention could get to the text of the Constitution, the
Antifederalists objected to the first three words of the preamble, "We the
People." 93 David Caldwell and Joseph Taylor saw in that phrase confirmation of their belief that legislators would usurp power. 94 As Taylor explained, he was:
astonished that the servants of the legislature of North Carolina should
go to Philadelphia and, instead of speaking of the state of North Carolina, should speak of the people. I wish to stop power as soon as possi-

ble; for they may carry their assumption of power to a more dangerous
length. I wish to know where they found the power of saying, We, the
people, and of consolidating the states 5
The. appearance of another form of the dreaded "consolidation" showed
that the fear of losing the states as viable organs of government was never
far from the Antifederalists' thoughts.
The response of the Federalists was logically correct but persuasively
impotent; they seemed either unwilling or unable to answer the Antifederalists directly. The Federalists pointed out that the Philadelphia convention had only proposed the Constitution; it had not ratified it.96 Their
arguments about the need for a change from the Articles of Confederation
were conceded,97 but with an insistence that the Philadelphia convention
had still exceeded its powers.
ARTICLE I -

CONGRESS

By the time the delegates reached the text of the Constitution itself,
they had been in convention for more than three days. Debate on the first
article, the provisions for Congress, then occupied just over two addi92. Id. at 29-30.
93.

U.S.

CONST.

preamble.

94. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 15-16, 24.
95. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). Concluding the debate for the Antifederalists, William Lenoir asked, "If the best characters departed so far from their authority, what may
not be apprehended from others, who may be agents in the new government." Id. at 203.
Likewise, William Lancaster observed that allowing nine states to promulgate the new constitution was itself a violation of the Articles of Confederation, which required unanimous
consent for change. That violation of the fundamental law was, he argued, "precedent" for
violation of the proposed constitution. Only a bill of rights could prevent such a violation.

Id. at 213. For a general discussion of the Antifederalists' fear of abuse of power, see J.
MAIN, supra note 8, at 9-15.
96. ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 16-17, 24.
97. Id. at 25.
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tional days. Although delegates mentioned many different issues, the Antifederalists concentrated on two provisions: section four, which allowed
Congress to "make or alter" regulations for the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives"; and section
eight, which gave Congress the power "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."98 William Goudy summarized the Antifederalist position on both provisions. Speaking on the
latter provision, he declared, "This clause with the clause of elections, will
totally destroy our liberties."'99
Not even the Federalists could wholeheartedly endorse the provision
that allowed Congress to regulate elections. Governor Samuel Johnston,
an ardent supporter of the Constitution, conceded that he could not
"comprehend the reason of this part."' 00 For him the proper strategy
would be to join with other states that had ratified the Constitution and
had directed that the provision be removed.' 0 ' But that compromise
would not satisfy the Antifederalists who saw the clause as an attack on
state legislatures; it "look[ed] forward to a consolidation of the government of the United States, when the state legislatures may entirely decay
away.' 0 2 Or, as James McDowell
foretold, the states would only "be kept
03
up as boards of elections.'
Even though Federalists such as Iredell professed allegiance to the
states, insisting that the Constitution itself depended upon the continuation of the states,' 0 4 the Antifederalists remained unpersuaded. They condemned the provision as unnecessarily vague and therefore easily subject
to abuse. If, they asked, the provision was needed only when a state failed
to provide for election, why had the language not been explicit? 0 5
The Federalists urged reassuringly that delegates to Congress could
be trusted. As Archibald Maclaine argued, "It cannot be supposed that
the representatives of our general government will be worse men than the
members of our state government. Will we be such fools," he asked, "as to
send our greatest rascals to the general government? We must be both
fools as well as villains to do so."'0 The Antifederalists did not expect
rascals for delegates or fools for electors. They did, however, expect that
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 8. For an account of the development of the debate over
whether Congress should have an independent income, see J. MAIN, supra note 8, at 72-80.
99. ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 1, at 93. One of the Bloodworths had a similar
thought when he said that the constitution "if adopted in its present mode, must end in the
subversion of our liberties." Id. at 55. (The reporter of the debates never identified which of
the Bloodworths was speaking. All commentators, however, have assumed that it was
Timothy, not James, who spoke.)

100.
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103.
104.
105.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54-55.

106. Id. at 64; cf. id. at 69 (Maclaine).
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power would be abused; the nature of human beings assured it. After all,
they had already seen that the "best" delegates had exceeded their powers in Philadelphia. No amount of rhetorical questioning could satisfy the
Antifederalists.
When the debate turned to the eighth section of article I, the Antifederalists repeated arguments which had been well honed in the debate
against the even more distant parliament in London. The idea that taxation should be imposed only by representatives of those taxed was of
course a major element of the debate with Britain.10 7 The justification of
that argument reflects the understanding that colonial North Carolinians
had of the nature of law and the meaning of "constitution."
Maurice Moore had published a traditional attack on taxation by
Parliament in 1765, with the basic theme that there should be no taxation
without representation. 0 " One argument, though, was especially telling
with respect to the later debate on the Constitution. Moore pointed to a
long practice of imposing taxes for the public benefit only by the people's
representatives. From that practice he concluded that "it is clearly to be
inferred, that the right of prescribing the measure and manner of raising
all taxes is a constitutional one, which was enjoyed by the ancestors of the
Colonists."109
Once again Judge Spencer encapsulated the Antifederalist position:
He asserted that the "most certain criterion of happiness that any people
can have, is to be taxed by their own immediate representatives, - by
those representatives who intermix with them, and know their circumstances, - not by those who cannot know their situation. Our federal
representatives cannot sufficiently know our situation and circumstances."' 110 The likelihood of abuse was all the more fearful when the
government also controlled the army, as would be the case under the
Constitution. To join the power of the sword with the power of the purse
was to assure tyranny.1
Judge Spencer suggested that the Constitution should not allow the
national government to tax individuals directly." 2 Instead, he proposed
107.

For example, North Carolina's delegates to the First Continental Congress were

instructed to "assert our rights to all the privileges of British subjects particularly that of
paying no taxes or duties but with our own consent." 9 CRNC, supra note 5, at 1048. See
Haywood, The Mind of the North Carolina Opponents of the Stamp Act, 29 N.C. HIsT.
REV. 317 (1952).

108. Moore, The Justice and Policy of Taxing the American Colonies in Great Britain, Considered,reprinted in SO E EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TRACTS CONCERNING NORTH CAR-

OLINA 165 (W.Boyd ed. 1927).
109. Id. James Iredell used a similar argument in 1774. See 1 HIOGINBOTHAM'S IREDELL, supra note 19, at 255.
110. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 80. Spencer had previously complained that
"[e]very power is given over our money to those over whom we have no immediate control."

Id. at 75. Cf. Southern Historical Collection, Revolutionary Papers, Freeholders of Pitt
County (Aug. 15, 1774) ("That it is the first Law of Legislation" and of the British Constitution "that citizens are taxed by their own Representatives.")
111. See, e.g., ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 56, 93, 169, 172.
112. Id. at 80-82.
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to amend the Constitution to continue a variant of the practice under the
Articles of Confederation. Congress would have an ultimate power to tax
individuals, but it should first requisition the states for money, leaving to
the states the means for raising the sums by taxation. 1 3 In explaining the
reason for that preference, Spencer reiterated the Antifederalist theme
that knowledge of local conditions was an essential element in enhancing
the ameliorative tendencies of law. I " The state legislatures, he argued,
would "know every method and expedient by which the people can pay,
and they will recur to the most convenient.""' 5
To the Federalists, Spencer's amendment was both irrelevant and
cumbersome. To them the "radical vice" of the Articles of Confederation
was that it acted on states rather than on individuals." 6 Richard Dobbs
Spaight, another of the delegates to the Philadelphia convention and a
Federalist representative from Craven County, explained why it was necessary to cure the vice. Spaight's response to Spencer revealed much
about the difference between the two sides. Spaight argued that he need
do no more than point to the experience under the Confederation to
prove that requisitions were simply inefficient. Moreover, he observed,
"the state officers will more probably commit abuses than" would federal
officers appointed to collect taxes." 7 The proposed national government
would provide the necessary corrective by putting the government in the
hands of a "better" sort who would be less likely to commit the degradations experienced in North Carolina and other states. Another Federalist
delegate, Whitmill Hill from Martin County, provided a similar insight.
To support his belief that the delegates to Congress could be trusted,""
Hill responded to Spencer by noting "that Congress are acquainted with
us - go from us - are situated like ourselves."" 9 But he had "no confidence in the [state] legislature; the people do not suppose them to be
120
honest men.'

Once again the debate in the convention echoed a long-standing dis113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 81. See also one of the convention's proposed amendments to the
constitution:
When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall immediately inform
the executive power of each state of the quota of each state, according to the
census herein directed, which is proposed to be thereby raised; and if the legislature of any state shall pass any law which shall be effectual for raising such a
quota at the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by Congress
shall not be collected in such state.
Id. at 245.
116. Id. at 21-22 (Davie).
117. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 82. For a discussion of the Federalists' general
distrust of state governments see G. WOOD, supra note 81, at 519-64. For further discussion
about Richard Dobbs Spaight, see Andrews, Richard Dobbs Spaight, 1 N.C. HIST. REV. 95
(1924).
118. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 86.
119. Id. at 85.
120. Id. at 87.
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pute. For example, efforts to provide a check on the state legislators had
proved a sticking point for the drafters of the North Carolina Constitution in 1776. Samuel Johnston wrote to James Iredell that he feared he
could not accede to the draft. "Numbers," he explained, "have started in
the race of Popularity and condescend to the usual means of success."' 2 1
Shortly thereafter Johnston reported that the provincial congress had
been unable to agree on a constitution. "The great difficulty in our way is
how to establish a Check on the Representatives of the people to prevent
their assuming more power than would be consistent with the Liberties of
2
the People, such as increasing the time of their duration and such like.'1 2
A remark by Iredell was similarly revealing, though no doubt unintentionally. He warned that there was a risk of rebellion if Congress
lacked the power to raise money directly from individuals. After all, he
asked, "[ius it not reasonable the people would be more apt to side with
their state legislature, who indulged them, than with Congress, who imposed taxes upon them?' 2 3 Once again the contrasting views of government were evident. For the Antifederalists, government represented the
political response to needs; government dealt with problems in a way that
provided amelioration, however indulgent and fleeting. The only government that could be assured of so acting was one that was small enough,
and close enough, to be responsive. For the Federalists, such a government was not to be trusted; its enactments shifted with the changing political tides. The Federalists sought a government with an assured source
of funds, one whose delegates went from them to decide upon national
issues and who had the power to impose those national solutions upon
individuals without any interference from mediating governments. As Iredell explained it: "[T]he representatives of the people may probably be
more popular, [thus] it may be sometimes necessary for the Senate to
prevent factious measures taking place, which may be highly injurious to
the real interests of the public, the Senate should not be at the mercy of
every popular clamor. '124 Of course, the Antifederalists would not concede that the "real interests of the public" were different from the "popular clamor" in their small communities.
ARTICLE

II -

THE EXECUTIVE

Similar differences pervaded the debate on the executive, which took
no more than a full day of the convention's time. For the most part,
though, both sides viewed the executive as being relatively insignificant
and not worthy of a great deal of concern. This is ironic in light of the
121.

1 HIGGINBOTHAM'S IREDELL, supra note 19, at 350, Johnston to Iredell (Apr. 17,

1776).
122. Id., Johnston to Iredell (April 20, 1776), reprintedin 10 CRNC, supra note 5, at
498. For a discussion on the Constitution in general, see E. DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 11535.
123. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 92.
124. Id. at 40. Iredell later remarked that the Senate was needed "to counteract the
influence of the people" in the House and to preserve the states. Id. at 133.
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fear of monarchy and the consequent extraordinary difficulty the Philadelphia convention experienced in drafting article 1I.125 The one topic
that provoked substantial discussion also revealed the minor role envisioned for the president. Judge Spencer objected to the failure to separate
the executive from the legislative powers, especially with respect to treaties and nominations.126 Spencer observed that other than his military
powers, the president could "do nothing in the executive department
without the advice of the Senate.'1 2 7 Since the Antifederalists anticipated
that members of Congress, and senators especially, would be corrupted by
long stays in the capital, they were apprehensive that this combination of
executive and legislative powers would further the destruction of liberty. 2 8 The particular concern was the treaty power which could be used
to override any state law. With the careful calculation of a pessimist, the
Antifederalists announced that approval of a treaty required as few as ten
senators. (The calculation went this way: two-thirds of the Senate could
ratify a treaty; a quorum of the first Senate, with twenty-six members,
12
would be fourteen members; two-thirds of that quorum would be ten.) 9
Thus, as Joseph McDowell complained, their "lives and property [were]
in the hands of eight or nine men" on all matters but treaties and then
only ten. 30
The Federalists' response was entirely logical and proper, but not
likely to persuade. Davie conceded the value of separating powers; he had
even argued in its favor that it was one of the advantages the Constitution had over the Articles of Confederation.' 3 ' But he urged that no one
could realistically expect "absolute and complete separation."' 2 Even in
the government of North Carolina there were examples of a mix of powers: the legislature appointed judges and fixed the salary of the governor. 33 Iredell supported this argument by pointing out that the ability of
the Senate to control treaty-making power was actually an assurance that
the sovereignty of the states would be respected. 4 But, once again, Iredell's remarks revealed the important distinction between the two posi125. See generallyJ. Scor, James Madison's notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 and their relation to a more perfect society (1918). For a discussion of the
convention debate on article II, see generally NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON (A. Koch ed. 1984).
126. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 116-17.
127. Id. at 117.
128. Id. at 118.
129. Id. at 119.
130. Id. Compare the similar objection from William Porter of Rutherford County. Id.
at 115.
131. Id. at 121. See also id. at 20-23 (Davie's earlier comments on the same topic.).
Iredell described the separation of powers as the "[o]ne great alteration from the Articles of
Confederation." Id. at 73. See also id. at 206 (Spaight's comment on separation of powers).
132. Id. at 21.
133. Id. See also North Carolina Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights 4 ("[T]he
legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate, and distinct from each other.")

134.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 1, at 125.
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tions. To Iredell, the Senate did not exist merely to preserve the interests
of the state sovereignties, it also existed to control the fluctuating popular
interest within the states: "There ought to be some power given to the
Senate to counteract the influence of the people by their biennial representation in the other house, in order to preserve completely the sovereignty of the states." 135
ARTICLE III -

THE JUDICIARY

By the time the delegates reached article III, the judiciary article,
they had been in convention for an entire week. They would not spend
two full days on the judiciary. Nevertheless, this debate went to the heart
of the dispute between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. For the
Antifederalists the federal judiciary posed more than merely another
threat of consolidation, though it did that as well. Of utmost importance
was the failure of the proposed Constitution to protect trial by jury in
civil trials. 3" This failure struck at the core of the Antifederalists' view of
law as ameliorative; the jury, along with the local legislature, provided the
twin pillars upon which their view of law was based.
Judge Spencer began the debate by stating the familiar fundamental
objection: the federal judiciary would usurp the place of the state courts,
which would "produce that consolidation through the United States

which is apprehended.1137 He illustrated his concerns by arguing that the

"state courts [were] sufficient to decide the common controversies of the
people, without distressing them [the people] by carrying them to such
far distant tribunals."'' 3 8 The response of the Federalists was twofold.
First, they argued that in any government there must be a judiciary with
power coextensive with that of the legislature. 13 9 And second, they argued
that Congress would surely take the inconvenience of travel into account
and establish inferior courts in every state. 40 Davie went so far as to argue that without a federal judiciary the Constitution itself would be disobeyed.141 But his argument again carried him too far to offer the Antifederalists any reassurance. Davie contended that "[w]ithout a general
controlling judiciary, laws might be made in particular states to enable its
citizens to defraud the citizens of other states."'1 42 For illustration, he

pointed to the various acts passed by legislators to relieve debtors. "By
135. Id. at 133.
136. Both sides could point to a long history of trial by jury in England and to the
early reference in the proprietors' instructions of 1676, urging the governor to promote laws

to "best secure the antient and native rights of Englishmen, and in particular the tryall of
all Criminall [sic] Causes and matters of fact by a jury of 12 sufficient freeholders." 1

CRNC, supra note 5, at 231.
137. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 137, 164.
138. Id. at 139.
139. Id. at 139, 158.
140. Id. at 139. Maclaine thought that Congress would also provide local means for

redressing grievances against federal officials. Id. at 47.
141. Id. at 156-57.
142. Id. at 157.
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such iniquitous laws," he concluded, "the merchant or farmer may be defrauded of a considerable part of his just claims. But in the federal court,
real money will be recovered with that speed which is necessary to accom143
modate the circumstances of individuals.
Few comments were more revealing than the ease with which Davie
implicitly sided with the creditors. For both Davie and the Federalists,
the federal courts would enforce the national law directly against individuals and against equitable claims of need.1 44 But that was precisely the
wrong balance insofar as the Antifederalists were concerned. Matthew
Locke, an Antifederalist from Rowan County, disputed Davie's imputation about the state courts. In revealing words, Locke disagreed that "justice and equity are given up at once in the states.' 1 45 He was no defender
of paper money and other relief measures, conceding that if "the evil
could have been avoided, it would have been a very bad law."' 46 But, siding with debtors with even gentler implication, Locke argued that "necessity, sir, justified it in some degree. 147 It was that necessity, that justice
and equity, which the Antifederalists were unwilling to abandon to the
certain control of a national government.
On this point, at least, the Regulators had anticipated the Antifederalist position. 4 " Hermon Husband's "basic arguments [were] directed
against professional lawyers and judges whom he saw as increasing their
own importance and power at the expense of the jury, in whom Husband
would invest final judgment not only of evidence but of questions of law
also.' ' 4 9 Likewise, there was strong objection to the denial of a trial by
jury even to those who had sided with the British. The objection was so
strong that North Carolina superior court judges declared an act of the
legislature unconstitutional in Bayard v. Singleton'"0 in 1787. "An Independent Citizen" castigated the legislature for its action.' The author of
the broadside argued, in the style of the Antifederalists, that his position
was so evident that anyone could know it simply by appealing to "the
143. Id. at 159.
144. See "A Citizen of North Carolina," State Gazette of North Carolina, Sept. 15,
1788.
145. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 169.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. For a discussion of the Regulators' "Country" values, see Ekirch, The North Carolina Regulators on Liberty and Corruption, 1766-1771, 11 PERSP. IN AM.HIST. 199 (D.
Fleming ed. 1977-1978). That article is incorporated into chapter six of A. EKIRCH, supra
note 14, at 161-202.
149. J. Whittenburg, Backwoods Revolutionaries: Social Context and Constitutional
Theories of the North Carolina Regulators, 1765-1771 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia 1974). For Husband's argument, see Hermon Husband's Continuation,
supra note 37, at 57-64.
150. 1 N.C. 15 (1787). This was one of the earliest assertions of the power of judicial
review. See generally L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 63-68 (1932); C. HAINES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 112-20 (2d. rev. ed. 1959).
151. "An Independent Citizen" to "the Honorable W.R. Davie, Esq." (July 30, 1787),
reprinted in SOME EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TRACTS, supra note 108, at 461-86.
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Nothing could "save him from destruction"

but "an impartial trial by a jury of his neighbors well acquainted with
him and his cause, and the malignity of his accusers.1 153 It was clear to

this author, as it was to the Antifederalists, that a jury was required to
assert the sense of the community against the intervening assertions of
accusers, all of whom were malign. There was no apparent expectation
that the jury would be neutral; rather the jurors would be neighbors
ready to reach a result depending upon the necessities of the case. Furthermore, anticipating the maxims of Reverend Caldwell, this author disputed that whatever a legislature declared to be law was law. "This imaginary omnipotence of Assembly, that whatever is ordained must be law,
without any exception of right or wrong, must be restrained within
bounds of reason, justice, and natural equity."1 54 To guarantee those restraints, every statute was to be tested against the "written laws of God,"
"fundamental rights and franchises declared in the great charter," the
"constitution," and "truth.

'155

Even though Federalists such as Iredell

agreed that the judiciary could review legislative enactments, they narrowed the standard to the Constitution itself. The Federalists would not
permit the inquiry to broaden beyond the limiting language of the Constitution; they certainly would not introduce the notions of "truth" and
"justice" into the inquiry as would the Antifederalists.
Because jurors injected justice and equity into a trial, the Antifederalists were determined to oppose any government that did not guarantee
the right to a trial by jury in civil cases. As Spencer said:
Juries are called the bulwarks of our rights and liberty; and no country
can ever be enslaved as long as those cases which affect their lives and
property are to be decided, in a great measure, by the consent of twelve
honest, disinterested men, taken from the respectable body of
yeomanry.' 56
The Federalists did not disagree in principle. Iredell, for instance,
had once written that the English had "no institution [that] is more Noble, or a strong Guardian of Liberty, than the inestimable Trial by
Jury. 151 But by 1788 the two sides had come to perceive different purposes for the jury. In a jury of respectable "yeomanry," the Antifederalists found their assurance of liberty and rights. Nothing could be more
stark than to contrast that claim with the comparable assurance of the
Federalists, who found safety for their liberty and rights in the federal
judiciary and in delegates to Congress who would be elected "from among
ourselves. They will be in the same situation with us. They are to be the
bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. They cannot injure us without
152. Id. at 464.
153. Id. (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 471 (emphasis in original).
155. Id.

156. Id. at 154.
157. 1 HiGGINBOTHAM'S

IREDELL,

supra note 19, at 393.
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injuring themselves. I have no doubt but we shall choose the best men in
the community."'I5 Neither side disputed the other's characterization of
the composition of the jury versus "the best men in the community." It
was for that very reason that Antifederalists Galloway and McDowell
feared the Congress because it would not represent the people of the
backcountry. 159 Likewise, Samuel Johnston was apprehensive about a
trial by a jury whose members might be "intimate friends of my
opponent." 110
The differences were indeed so stark that when the debate broadened
to include a debate about the need for a bill of rights, the delegates could
find no common ground. The Antifederalists saw in all power the likelihood of abuse and corruption. William Lenoir was confident that all men
"naturally put the fullest construction on the power given them."'' And
one of the Bloodworths recalled the theoretical maxim of Caldwell when
he asserted that "[riulers are always disposed to abuse" their powers. 6 2
In light of the fact that there was so much vagueness in the Constitution,
the Antifederalists insisted that there be a bill of rights. As Samuel Spencer said, a "bill of rights would be necessary to guard against our
3
rulers.''1

The function of a bill of rights, for the Antifederalists, was very much
the function that Caldwell had envisioned for his maxims. Both provided
a standard by which the citizenry could judge the propriety of the conduct of officials. 6 In the proposed Constitution there was "no express
negative - no fence against [essential rights] being trampled upon."''
The Antifederalists condemned the Constitution because it contained no
phrase such as that which appeared in article two of the Articles of Confederation: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
' 66
assembled.'

158. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 57 (Samuel Johnston) (emphasis added).
James Iredell held the same view. Iredell predicted that those selected for the Senate would
be "two of the most respectable men in [each] State." Id. at 40.
159. Id. at 70, 88.
160. Id. at 150.
161. Id. at 206.
162. Id. at 167.
163. Id. at 138.
164. Id. at 9.
165. Id. at 168.
166. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II (emphasis added), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 27 (G. Tansill ed.

1927). Thomas Burke had almost single-handedly been responsible for the inclusion of that
provision in the Articles. North Carolina State Archives, Governors Letter Books, no. 1.1,
Burke to Caswell (Apr. 29, 1777), reprinted in 11 SRNC, supra note 1, at 460 (spoke of
necessity for maintaining separate independence of the states); M. JENSEN, supra note 5, at
170-76, 179; Hendricks, Joining the Federal Union, in THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE
148 (L. Butler & A. Watson eds. 1984). For an account of Burke's changing philosophy, see

Douglas, supra note 5.
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Without such a limiting phrase, Spencer warned, the rulers
might exceed the proper boundary without being taken notice of. When
there is no rule but a vague doctrine, they [the rulers] might make
great strides, and get possession of so much power that a general insurrection of the people would be necessary to bring an alteration about.
boundary is passed, the people
But if a boundary were set up, when the
7
would take notice of it immediately.1

To the Antifederalists the image of an ever watchful citizenry was not
merely a vision, it was a vital component of their view of government
comprising a small, homogeneous community. Thus, any "constitution
ought to be understood by every one. The most humble and trifling charthe country have a right to know what foundation they stand
acters in
68
upon."'
To the Federalists a bill of rights was worse than unnecessary, it was
positively dangerous. In the words of Maclaine, "the powers of Congress
are expressly defined; and the very definition of them is as valid and efficacious a check as a bill of rights could be, without the dangerous implication of a bill of rights."16s9 Moreover, the proper guardians of the rights
of the people were not the people themselves, but the federal courts as
created by the Constitution. Iredell, along with the other Federalists, saw
the Constitution not as a vague, dangerous document, but as "a declaration of particular powers by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes."' 7 0 It was like a power of attorney, granting only those
powers it mentioned and no others.' 7 ' Or, in the words of an anonymous
essayist, the Constitution "is all a bill of Rights, and every right not there
expressed is retained by the several States.' 17

2

Thus Congress had no

power to interfere with trial by jury, or with any of a number of other
167.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 1, at 168. Spencer made a similar argument earlier.

Id. at 137. Iredell did not disagree; he even used the same metaphor.

I readily agree there ought to be such a fence. The instrument ought to contain
such a definition of authority as would leave no doubt; and if there be any ambi-

guity, it ought not to be admitted.
• * , If this Constitution be adopted, it must be presumed the instrument will be

in the hands of every man in America, to see whether authority be usurped; and

any person by inspecting it may see if the power claimed be enumerated. If it be
not, he will know it to be a usurpation.
Id. at 171-72.
168. Id. at 201. One of Caldwell's maxims contained a similar thought: "It [the compact between the rulers and the people] ought to be plain, obvious, and easily understood."
Id. at 9.
169. Id. at 140. Maclaine put the argument to use in the debate about impeachment.
See id. at 34, 49. Cf. id. at 64 (Samuel Johnston); id. at 220 (James Iredell).

170. Id. at 148. Iredell earlier had said that the line "between the power which is given
and that which is retained" was "most accurately drawn by the positive grant of the powers
of the general government." Id. at 10. For Iredell's response to George Mason's objections
on this point, see 2 McREE'S IREDELL, supra note 2, at 186-88.
171. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 10.
172. A North Carolina Citizen on the Federal Constitution, 1788, 16 N.C. His. REV.
36, 42 (1939).
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rights, because the Constitution gave it no such power - at least in the
eyes of the Federalists."7 3
The danger from a bill of rights arose because no one could possibly
mention every right. Because a constitution was an affirmative statement
of powers, not subject to equitable construction, any attempt to list certain rights would properly be construed as saying that any unlisted rights
were not protected. 17 4 In particular, it would serve no purpose to attempt
to guarantee a trial by jury in civil trials because the states were so different in their customs that no single declaration could satisfy all states. 7 0
But that response, like so many of the other Federalist responses, did
little more than reassure the Antifederalists of the wisdom of their opposition. For if the states differed so in a practice as crucial as trial by jury,
176
then they were too diverse to form a union of any longevity.
ARTICLES IV, V, VI, AND

VII

-

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

The final four articles occupied about two days of the convention.
The reporter, however, accurately captured the nature of the debate on
these articles, describing it as "desultory.' ' 7 7 The only provision to attract substantial attention was that in article six declaring that the Constitution would be the "supreme law of the land." Article six, according to
Bloodworth, would "sweep off all the constitutions of the states. It is a
total repeal of every act and constitution of the states. . . . It will produce an abolition of the state governments.' 78 Nothing that Davie, or
Maclaine, or Iredell could say would remove that fear from the Antifederalists. Davie's statement that the enactments could "be supreme only in
cases consistent with the powers specially granted, and not in usurpations,"' 7 9 was of no help. Neither was Samuel Johnston helpful in his assertion: "Without this clause, the whole Constitution would be a piece of
blank paper."'' I 0 In the end, as Willie Jones observed, the "arguments...
had been listened to attentively, but he believed no person had changed
his opinion."'' The Antifederalists and the Federalists were simply too
far separated on basic assumptions and experience for there to have been
compromise and change of position.

173. Iredell and Spaight used this argument with respect to religion. ELLIOT'S DEsupra note 1, at 194, 208.
174. Id. at 142, 149.
175. Id. at 150.
176. Id. at 151 (Bloodworth).
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id. at 179.
179. Id. at 182.
180. Id. at 188.
181. Id. at 217. Bloodworth uttered a curt version of the same view: "Many words
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have been spoken, and long time taken up; but with me they have gone in at one ear and

out at the other." Id. at 143. When called to order, he slightly modified his statement. Id. at
144.

